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JUSTICE FOR FOCA: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR YUGOSLAVIA'S PROSECUTION OF RAPE
AND ENSLAVEMENT AS CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
James McHenry
t
Before 1992 Foca was a small, bucolic town in southeastern Bosnia-
Herzegovina whose population of approximately 40,000 was almost evenly
divided between Muslim and Serb ethnic groups.' Today, however, Foca's
population is approximately 24,000, and fewer than 100 non-Serbs live
within its borders. Moreover, the stunning demographic changes only tell
part of the story. After Foca was overrun by Bosnian Serb forces in 1992,
the conquerors instituted drastic measures to reduce the non-Serb
population as part of a broader campaign of ethnic cleansing in regions of
Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed by Serbia.3 To effectuate this policy, the
Bosnian Serb leaders in charge of Foca murdered most of the non-Serb
4
men in the town and sent the survivors to concentration camps. Many of
the women, however, were not immediately killed.5 Instead, they,
including some as young as twelve, were sent to "rape camps" where they
were forced to perform sexual services for the Bosnian Serb soldiers.'
Many of the women were gang-raped and forced to live in a condition of
sexual slavery;' indeed, two were even sold as chattel for 500 DM
tVisiting Adjunct Instructor, Middle Tennessee State University. BSFS, Georgetown
University, 1997. J.D./Ph.D., Vanderbilt University, 2003. 1 would like to thank Brooke
Ackerly, W. James Booth, Olga Meerson, and Carol Swain for their insights into the issues
addressed in this article. Any mistakes, however, are solely those of the author.
1. "A Closed Dark Place:" Past and Present Human Rights Abuses in Foca, 10 HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH REPORT 6(D) (July 1998), at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/foca/
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(Deutschmark) each.8 Put simply, these actions were "calculated, cynical,
and subhuman." 9
The atrocities committed upon the men and women of Foca are
almost unthinkable, yet they tragically symbolize the second attempt in
fifty years of one European ethnic group trying to completely eradicate
another European ethnic group.1 ° Moreover, although murder and
genocide were significant elements of this ethnic cleansing campaign, the
Bosnian Serb actions also involved a targeted campaign of gruesome
dehumanization, actualized as the rape and sexual enslavement of
approximately 20,000 women, whose scale of inhumanity is unique in
modern times."
On February 22, 2001, nine years after the Bosnian Serb soldiers came
to Foca, Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (ICTY) found three Bosnian Serb soldiers (Dragoljub
Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic) guilty of committing crimes
against humanity including torture, rape, and enslavement. 2 The ICTY's
verdict in Prosecutor v. Kunarac was immediately hailed by human rights
organizations worldwide because, for the first time, it established rape as
both a crime against humanity and a war crime. 3 Furthermore, it
expanded the definition of slavery as a crime against humanity to include
sex slavery, for previously slavery as a crime against humanity only
encompassed forced labor.14
Although the initial reception to the verdict was overwhelmingly
positive, its full impact may not be felt for many years as other warring
groups, both now and in the future, must bear it in mind when
8. Bosnia: Landmark Verdicts for Rape, Torture, and Sexual Enslavement (Feb. 22,
2001), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/02/serbiaO222.htm.
9. J. F. BROWN, HOPES AND SHADOWS: EASTERN EUROPE AFTER COMMUNISM 249
(1994).
10. See, e.g., WALTER LAQUER & JUDITH TYDOR BAUMEL, THE HOLOCAUST
ENCYCLOPEDIA (2001).
11. William Drozdiak, Serb Forces Rape 20,000 in Bosnia, EC Team Finds, WASH. POST,
Jan. 9, 1993, at A12.
12. See generally Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2fjudgementl
kuntj010222e.pdf.
13. See, e.g., Bosnia: Landmark Verdict for Rape, Torture and Sexual Enslavement, supra
note 8; Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Foca Verdict - Rape and Sexual
Enslavement are Crimes Against Humanity (February 22, 2001), available at http:/lwww.
web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/EUR630042001?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES/BOSNI
A-HERZEGOVINA.




contemplating committing similar acts." Despite its potential to
fundamentally reshape international law and norms of international
warfare, the Kunarac decision is not uncontroversial. Like almost every
crimes against humanity trial before it, Kunarac raises troubling issues
about the international community's judgment of state and individual
sovereignty as well as the possible creation of ex post facto crimes.1
6
Moreover, the Kunarac decision also raises a potential question about its,
arguably, underlying view of women as weak and defenseless individuals.
7
Just as the promulgation of the Battered Women's Syndrome defense
sparked controversy in American legal circles over its possible underlying
stereotyping of women, so too may Kunarac raise questions in
international legal circles regarding whether women should have a unique
space as victims in crimes against humanity.'
This note argues that despite these potential criticisms, the (belated)
expansion of the definition of "crimes against humanity" in Kunarac was
warranted for several reasons. First, it closed illogical gaps in the
international legal conceptualizations of "rape/enslavement," "torture,"
"war crimes," and "crimes against humanity."' 9 Second, it broadened
international protections of civilians, especially those of different
ethnicities, from even unsystematic acts of depravity. 2° Third, it fully
codified women as equal to men in the human community but did not
unfairly single women out as a weaker gender in need of protection.2'
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000).
17. See Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination
and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151 (David
Kairys, ed., 1982) (criticizing gender-based rape laws).
18. See, e.g., Pamela Posch, The Negative Effects of Expert Testimony on the Battered
Women's Syndrome, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 485 (1998); A. Renee Callahan,
Will the "Real" Battered Woman Please Stand Up? In Search of a Realistic Legal Definition
of Battered Woman Syndrome, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 117 (1994); Kristian Miccio, In the
Name of Mothers and Children: Deconstructing the Myth of the Passive Battered Mother and
the "Protected Child" in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1087 (1995).
19. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntj01022
2e.pdf; see also infra Part V.A.1. (discussing the legal foundations of Kunarac).
20. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/11-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntj01022
2e.pdf; see also infra Part IIJ.B.2. (discussing the significance of Kunarac for Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War).
21. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntj01022
2e.pdf; see also infra Part IV.D. (discussing Kunarac's assessment of women).
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Fourth, it established an historic foundation for the prosecution of war
crimes by other courts and in other locations but did not infringe upon the
22
sovereignty of either a state or an individual.
Part I of this note traces the development of international law
regarding crimes against humanity from its first codification at the
Nuremberg Trials following World War II to its status in the 1990's before
the Kunarac decision. Part II then discusses the specific context in which
the atrocities took place, namely the conflict among the newly independent
states which were republics in the former Yugoslavia. Part III analyzes the
Kunarac decision specifically showing how the previous canon of crimes
against humanity jurisprudence in international law was extended
theoretically to cover the heinous events that took place in Foca. Part IV
assesses and ultimately refutes the potential criticisms of Kunarac
including its perceived attacks of state and individual sovereignty and its
underlying view of women. Part V analyzes the implications of Kunarac
for the future of international law and reasserts the overall legality,
morality, and humanity of the Kunarac decision by locating it within the
larger space of international law, conventional morality, and human
decency. Kunarac may have been, in the words of U.N. Coordinator of
Operations, Jacques Klein, "a judgment that is long overdue,"' 3 but now
that it has finally arrived, its impact promises to be historic.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY 24
The idea of a crime against humanity, or against an entire
international community, had little resonance until the twentieth century.
Few states thought of their actions as being of such a nature to
deleteriously affect the entire international community, and even fewer
felt that they could be held to some standard even as the losing power
following a war. Nonetheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, some
22. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntj01022
2e.pdf; see also infra Parts IV.A.-B.,V.B.1. (discussing the sovereignty implications of
Kunarac and its possible use in future cases).
23. Bosnian Serbs Convicted of Rape (Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/hi/world/europe/1184313.stm.
24. See, e.g., BASS, supra note 16; see also Report by the Secretary-General 10-11, U.N.
Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (quoting the U.N. Secretary General's
connections between the 1907 Hague Conventions, the Nuremberg judgments, the 1949
Geneva Conventions, and the ICTY).
25. See, e.g., Timothy L. H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and
the Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 684-98 (1997).
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states recognized a need to establish guides for international conduct that
26
respected laws and norms of humanity.
A. International Law Regarding Humanity Prior to Nuremberg
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 first contemplated basing
normative principles on the "laws of humanity," a concept that could
logically lead to prosecutions based on crimes in violation of such laws.27
First called by Russia in 1899, the Conventions attempted to limit warfare
and an arms buildup and to establish an international court of justice.2
Although these Conventions were ultimately unsuccessful in limiting
warfare and what would later be deemed "crimes against humanity," they
did establish a foundation for prosecuting later violations of laws of
humanity in the twentieth century.29
The concept of individual criminal liability for human rights'
violations began to acquire more impact following World War 1.30 Article
23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations contained an express
provision regulating the treatment of individuals in member states.
Moreover, the postwar Allies attempted to try German leaders, including
the Kaiser, for war crimes.2 Additionally, the Allies sought to try Turkish
officials for their part in a campaign of genocide against Armenians in
1915-16.33 Political infighting among the Allies and realpolitik decision-
26. See generally GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE
FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE (1999) (tracing the history and development of the idea of crimes
against humanity).
27. See Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War, pmbl., para. 9, 32
Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 129 (1907). Paragraph 9 reads in part:
"Populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from
the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience." Id. See also Hague
Convention (II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32
Stat. 1803 (addressing international principles governing war on land); Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277
(updating the 1899 treaty).
28. William J. Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A
Study of Equitable Distribution, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 327-32 (2001).
29. McCormack, supra note 25, at 697.
30. See generally JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND
DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1982); see also
Karina Michael Wailer, Intrastate Ethnic Conflicts and International Law: How the Rise of
Intrastate Ethnic Conflicts has Rendered International Human Rights Laws Ineffective,
Especially Regarding Sex-Based Crimes, 9 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 621 (2001).
31. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 23(a).
32. WILLIS, supra note 30; see also McCormack, supra note 25, at 705-08.
33. WILLIS, supra note 30; see also McCormack, supra note 25, at 699-701.
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making in the postwar environment ultimately scuttled those plans, but an
idea for the postwar adjudication of particularly inhumane crimes during
wartime was planted, and this idea would come to fruition twenty-five
years later at Nuremberg.34
B. The Nuremberg Trials
Allied prosecutors in the Nuremberg Trials first used the phrase
"crimes against humanity."35 It was given meaning by the charter, which
established an International Military Tribunal to try Nazi officials
following the conclusion of World War II:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
responsibility:
(a)Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b)War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c)Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
36
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated ....
The trials at Nuremberg resulted in not only the convictions of several
German perpetrators of the Holocaust, but it also established a clear
34. McCormack, supra note 25, at 698-708.
35. Leo Gross, The Punishment of War Criminals: The Nuremberg Trial, 2 NETH. INT'L
L. REv. 356, 358 (1955). See also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1992).
36. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement),
Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, 288.
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foundation for the future prosecution of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 7
C. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War was concluded in 1949 and entered into force on
October 21, 1950." As its title implies, the Convention governs the
treatment of civilians during times of war.39 In particular, it asserts that
"[w]omen shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour,
in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent
assault."4 The force within international law of the Geneva Conventions is
well established, and Article 2 of the ICTY enabling statute explicitly
considers violations of the Geneva Conventions as offenses for which
41prosecution may be brought within its forum. Consequently, the ICTY's
reliance on the Conventions as a source for establishing rape as a crime
against humanity rests on a solid foundation of established international
law.
D. The ICTY
Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia was established in 1993 for
the prosecution of crimes committed during the fighting among the states
that emerged from the breakup of Yugoslavia." The statute provided for a
binding authority on the part of the ICTY to prosecute those individuals
accused of committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or customs of
37. BASS, supra note 16; see also Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the
Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 57 (1995)
(tracing the influence of the Nuremberg trials on the ICTY).
38. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Oct. 21, 1950, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S 287, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
y4gcpcp.htm.
39. Id.
40. Id. art. 27 (emphasis added).
41. Statute of the International Tribunal, art. 2, May 25, 1993 (amended Nov. 30, 2000),
at http://www.un.orglicty/legaldoc/index.htm.
42. See generally Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 41; see also U.N.
SCOR 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/Res 827 (1993) & U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(1993); ICTY Statue of the International Tribunal, art. 1, available at http://www.un.org/
icty/basic/statut/statute.htm (last visited October 10, 2001).
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war.43 Patricia M. Wald, a Judge on the ICTY and a former D.C. Circuit
Judge, offered the following assessment of the ICTY's scope:
The ICTY was created by United Nations Security Council Resolution
in 1993 to prosecute and adjudicate war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia on or after January 1991. That includes all aspects of the
Bosnian conflict as well as the more recent Kosovo war. The Tribunal
exercises personal jurisdiction over persons indicted for the categories
of war crimes set out in the ICTY Statute, wherever apprehended; no
extradition proceedings are necessary. It can impose sentences up to life
imprisonment, but not death. The Tribunal is a temporary court in the
sense that its mission is geographically and temporally limited. It is not
expected to finish its work for at least another decade. 4
Furthermore, Judge Wald has noted that although the ICTY follows
earlier war crimes tribunals in many important ways, it nonetheless faces
challenges that go beyond those of its predecessors:
The ICTY is a bold experiment. It tracks to some degree the earlier
Nuremberg and Tokyo World War II war crime trials but it goes far
beyond those precedents in important ways. It is performing three
functions: adjudicating international crimes, developing international
humanitarian law, and memorializing important, albeit horrible, events
of modern history. Except for Nuremberg and Tokyo and subsequent
isolated war crimes prosecutions in national courts of figures such as
Adolph Eichmann and Klaus Barbie, the Tribunal has very little
caselaw to rely upon. Its procedures are a hybrid of common law and
continental practice and its judges speak a dozen native languages more
fluently than the official French and English of the Tribunal.45
The most difficult aspect of the ICTY's work has been dealing with
"the darkest and most brutal tales ... of man's inhumanity to man and
woman, including genocide and crimes against humanity involving
thousands of victims, systematic rapes of women and girls, prolonged
detention under the most barbaric of conditions, merciless beatings, and
callous destruction of homes and villages." 46 Moreover, the ICTY has
43. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 41.
44. Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Comes of Age: Some Observations on Day-To-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 87(2001).
45. Id. at 89.
46. Id. at 88.
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contended with challenges to its jurisdiction47 and with charges that it is
biased against Serbs.48 Nonetheless, as of February 2002 - when the trial
began of Slobodan Milogevic, the former Serbian leader and the man many
argue is most responsible for the atrocities committed on the territory of
the former Yugoslavia49 - the ICTY has established itself as a significant
international judicial body capable of "perform[ing] important
adjudication and accountability functions that national courts in the thrall
of leaders who are themselves alleged war criminals cannot."50
II. THE FACTUAL BACKDROP TO KUNARAC
The roots of the 1990's conflict among the former republics of
Yugoslavia date back at least to their initial placement within a single
sovereign state following World War I, if not even earlier to their relations
among each other, first as territories within the larger Ottoman Empire
and then later as a mix of sovereign states (Serbia, Montenegro) and
possessions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina).51 Following the war, which had begun as the result of an
assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian imperial throne by a
Serb nationalist, the victorious Allies established the precursor to the
modern Yugoslavian state (aptly named to reflect the diverse groups
52
within its borders): the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. As
historian Joseph Rothschild has noted, this new state was almost
predestined to have problems:
Populated as it was by sundry antagonistic communities of widely
divergent cultures, who worshipped in several different religions, had
inherited eight legal systems from their former sovereignties, and wrote
the basic Serbocroatian language in two orthonographies (not to
47. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction).
48. See, e.g., Justin Brown, Facing Up to Atrocities?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Feb. 16, 1999, at 6. But see Seventh Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. General
Assembly Security Council, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 52, U.N. Doc. A/55/150 (2000),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2000/index.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2000).
49. Keith B. Richburg, Trial of Milosevic Begins; Yugoslav Ex-Leader Guided Atrocities,
U.N. Prosecutors Say, WASH. PosT., Feb. 13, 2002, at Al.
50. Wald, supra note 44, at 117-18.
51. See, e.g., Yugoslavia, at http./www. encyclopedia com/html/sectionlyugoslavjhistory.
asp (last visited Sept. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Yugoslavia].
52. Id.
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mention their several other Slavic and non-Slavic languages),
Yugoslavia was bound to be subjected to profound centrifugal pressures
which were to overwhelm her elite. Furthermore, areas of mixed
population, such as the Vojvodina, Bosnia, or Macedonia, functioned
less as bridges than as barriers, aggravating rather than easing these
centrifugal pressures."
United under a monarchy, this new state, whose name was changed to
Yugoslavia in 1929, was beset by internal nationalist strife among its
various ethnic groups in the 1920's and 1930's.54 Nazi Germany attacked in
1941 and established puppet states in Croatia and Serbia.55 Several
resistance groups of various nationalities emerged including one led by a
communist named Tito. 6 The Germans were driven from Belgrade in
1944, and Soviet troops established Tito as the new leader of Yugoslavia.5"
Under Tito, the new State consisted of six primary republics (Croatia,
Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro) and
two autonomous regions (Vojvodina and Kosovo). 5 Tito embarked upon
a vigorous campaign of communizing life in Yugoslavia, although he
formally split with Stalin and the Soviet Union in 1948.29 For the rest of his
life, Tito guided Yugoslavia on a path unique among communist states by
courting favor with both the West and the Eastern Bloc.60 Moreover, Tito
joined with several Third World countries in 1961 to form a nonaligned
movement that sought to successfully maintain relations with both the
61United States bloc and that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Domestically, Tito was quite successful at playing sides off against one
another, only within his country, this involved the various ethnic groups
residing in Yugoslavia. 6' To be sure, various ethnic issues cropped up
sporadically, but Tito, through the force of his "cult of personality" and his
adept management skills, successfully managed to sidestep major conflicts
from underlying ethnic tensions regarding power distribution and
53. JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD, EAST CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARS 202 (1974).






60. Yugoslavia, supra note 51.
61. Nonaligned Movement, at http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/n/nonalign.asp (last
visited Sept. 22, 2002).
62. Yugoslavia, supra note 51.
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territorial control. 3 Tito's successors after his death in 1980, however, were
not so skilled at playing one ethnic group against another, and following
the collapse of communism across Eastern Europe in 1989, the end was
also near for the state of Yugoslavia. 64
In 1987, Slobodan Milogevic was elected leader of the Serbian
Communist Party, and in 1989, he became President of Serbia.6 Following
attempts by Milogevic and his Serb backers to impose greater Serb
authority on the entire state, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina each declared its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991.66 In
response, Serbia used (primarily Serbian) federal troops to attack the
seceding states in an effort to unite all Serbian peoples under one flag. 67 A
campaign against Slovenia failed, but Serbia was more successful attacking
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.6 The latter, in particular, was a prime
target for Serbia because 30% of its population was Serbian.69
Additionally, Croatia also attacked Bosnia-Herzegovina to claim the lands
occupied by the 20% of the population that was Croatian.7" Therefore, by
1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was largely occupied by two outside forces, both
of whom were seeking the elimination of the local Bosnian Muslim
population and both of whom committed horrific acts, like the ones in
Foca, in order to achieve their objectives. 1 Although Croatia also
committed wartime atrocities, the Serbian crimes attracted more attention
because they were more widespread and involved larger numbers of
people.1
Despite international condemnation, fighting continued among
Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina for another three years before a
peace accord was reached in Dayton, Ohio, in 1995."3 The breakup and
subsequent fighting raised several important issues for international law,
including the question of how to treat those responsible for some of the
63. Id.; see also ROBERT KAPLAN, BALKAN GHOSTS: A JOURNEY THROUGH HISTORY
(1994).






70. Yugoslavia, supra note 51.
71. Id.
72. BROWN, supra note 9, at 265-70.
73. Yugoslavia, supra note 51.
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horrific acts perpetrated on the territories of the former Yugoslavia.74
Following the conclusion of the fighting, the United Nations established an
International Tribunal of the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, known as the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, or ICTY 5 As of November
7, 2001, the ICTY had 46 accused war criminals in custody, issued arrest
warrants for 31 others not in custody, and adjudicated the cases of 61
accused war criminals in proceedings before the Tribunal, including the
Kunarac case which was decided on February 22, 2001, and then appealed
16
on March 6, 2001.
III. THE KUNARAC DECISION77
All three defendants (Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovic), along with
78several co-defendants, were named in an indictment in 1996. Separate
indictments were issued for these three men in 1999, and they were tried
before the tribunal in 2000.79 All three, who were originally born in Foca,
were accused of crimes against humanity (i.e. torture, rape, enslavement)
and violations of the laws and customs of war (i.e. torture, rape, outrages
upon personal dignity)."' Kunarac was charged with all crimes; Kovac was
charged with rape, enslavement and outrages upon personal dignity;
Vukovic was charged with torture and rape."
A. Allegations
According to the factual allegations contained in the indictment, the
three men were part of the Bosnian Serb forces that took over Foca in
74. See generally PETER RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2002).
75. See generally United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, at http://www.un.org/icty (last visited Sept. 22, 2002) [hereinafter ICTY].
76. United Nations, Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance
/procfact-e.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2002).
77. See generally Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/
kuntj010222e.pdf.
78. United Nations, Case Information Sheet: KUNARAC, KOVAC and VUKOVIC Case
(IT-96-23-PT) (IT-96-23/1-PT) (March 21, 2002), at http:/fwww.un.org/icty/glance/kunar






April 19 92 .82 Following the takeover, most of the Croats and Muslims
were arrested, the men and women were separated, and all were kept in
various detention facilities. 83 Indeed, "[d]uring the arrests many civilians
were killed, beaten or subjected to sexual assault."8 Moreover, "[m]any of
the detained women were subjected to humiliating and degrading
conditions of life, to brutal beatings and to sexual assaults, including rapes
and gang rapes."85 Women and girls as young as twelve were subjected to
rape and sexual assaults at a detention center within a school building.
86
Each of the three defendants was singled out for specific instances of
brutality.87 Kunarac, the commander of a special reconnaissance unit of
the Bosnian Serb Army, was alleged, in his capacity as commander, to
have been responsible for the acts of the soldiers subordinate to him and to
have known or had reason to know that those subordinates were engaged
in the sexual assault of detained Muslim women.m Moreover, Kunarac was
alleged to have personally been involved with the sexual assaults and rapes
of Muslim women. 9 Kovac, a sub-commander of the military police and a
paramilitary leader in Foca, was alleged to have been involved with the
rapes and sexual assaults of detained Muslim women. Finally, Vukovic,
also a sub-commander of the military police and paramilitary leader in
Foca, was alleged to have been personally involved in the gang-rape of
women and girls detained at a local school.91 Moreover, he was alleged to
have sexually abused women, including a 15-year-old and a 16-year-old
detained at a sports hall, and to have arranged the removal of women from




84. KUNARAC, supra note 78.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see also CNN, Bosnian Serbs Jailed for War Sex Crimes, at http://www.cnn.com/
2001/WORLD/europe/02/22/hague.trial.02/index.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2002) (noting
the youthful ages of many of the victims).
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B. The Decision
On February 22, 2001, the ICTY handed down its decision convicting
the three defendants of war crimes and crimes against humanity.93
Presiding Judge Florence Mumba labeled the actions of Kunarac and the
others a "nightmarish scheme of sexual exploitation" that was "especially
repugnant." 94 Furthermore, she noted that the defendants "thrived in the
dark atmosphere of the dehumanisation of those believed to be enemies."95
In short, the ICTY left little doubt about its feelings regarding both the
guilt of Kunarac and the others and the utter depravity of their actions.96
Among the crimes for which the three defendants were convicted,
enslavement was already labeled as a crime against humanity by the
Nuremberg Trials; therefore, the Trial Chamber's decision to specifically
consider sexual enslavement as a crime against humanity did not require a
strong leap of thought in international law.97 What did require more
analysis, however, was the Trial Chamber's decision to also delineate rape
as a crime against humanity.98 The ICTY convicted the defendants for the
crimes of rape under Articles 3 and 5 of the ICTY's enabling statute and
under Article 3 of the Geneva Convention." The Chamber explicitly ruled
that the rapes that occurred in Foca constituted a war crime in violation of
both international humanitarian law and the Tribunal's Statute.' ° Most
significant, the Chamber also ruled that rape constitutes an outrage upon
personal dignity under Article 3(c) of the Geneva Conventions.'0 ' Thus,
although the prevention of the rape of women was not explicitly written
93. CNN, Convictions Highlight Tragic Victims, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD
/europe/02/22/hague.rape (last visited Sept. 22,2002).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/focaltrialc2/judgementkuntiOI022
2e.pdf.
97. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 36; see also Human Rights
Internet, The Individual and International Criminal Responsibility, at http://www.hri.ca
/doccentre/docs/hrd/handbook97/criminal.shtml#humanity (last visited Sept. 22, 2002)
(noting the categories of "crimes against humanity" used in the Nuremberg Trials).
98. See infra Part III.B.1,
99. Press Release, Judgement of Trial Chamber II in the Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic
Case (Feb. 22, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p566-e.htm [hereinafter Press
Release].
100. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 408 (Int'l Crim. Trib.





into the Conventions, it is still of the nature of actions that constitute warS 102
crimes as contemplated by the drafters.
1. Conviction Under Article 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal
The Trial Chamber found that all three defendants committed crimes
against humanity in violation of Article 5 of the ICTY's Statute.10 3 Article
5 of the Tribunal's Statute lays out offenses which constitute crimes against
humanity if they are committed during an armed conflict and are
considered to be directed against a civilian population.) 4 Specifically,
Article 5 states:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict,









(h)persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
• 105
(i) other inhumane acts.
The ICTY's jurisdiction under Article 5 is to try atrocities committed
by the participants of the Balkan conflict, and in order to try these crimes,
an initial threshold must be met, namely that it must be established that
the alleged offenses were actually committed during an armed conflict.1l
This general prerequisite for jurisdiction by the Tribunal is contained
solely within its Statute.' An armed conflict is defined as "a resort to
armed force between states or protracted armed violence between
102. Human Rights Internet, supra note 97.
103. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 437 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntj01
0222e.pdf.
104. Id. para. 410.
105. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 41, art. 5.
106. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 413 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
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governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a state."'O'
To fulfill this threshold requirement, an armed conflict must exist at
the time and place specified within the indictment1 o A relational "nexus"
between the defendant's acts and the conflict, however, is not required. u °
Rather, the requirement is met when a conflict is present at the designated
time and place."' In this context, therefore, the acts by the defendants
must have occurred during the Balkan conflict. The rapes in Foca
occurred during the Balkan conflict in 1992, and the war there was clearly
ongoing at the time. Consequently, the first threshold requirement for
jurisdiction by the ICTY was met.
After it determines that the offenses were committed during an
armed conflict, the ICTY then must conclude that the defendants carried
out an "attack" against the civilian population." The five elements of an
"attack directed against any civilian population" are:
(1) There must be an attack.
(2) The acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack.
(3) The attack must be "directed against any civilian population."
(4) The attack must be "widespread or systematic."
(5) The perpetrator must know of the wider context in which his acts
occur and know that his acts are part of the attack.'"3
An "attack" is defined as "a course of conduct involving the
commission of acts of violence."" 4 The term "attack" applies to both
persons engaged in armed conflict and also to the mistreatment of those
not taking part in the conflict, such as prisoners."' Additionally, a
108. Id. para. 412 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, para. 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia 1995)).
109. Id. para. 413 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, paras. 249, 251 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1999)).
110. Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, paras. 249, 272 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia 1999); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, No. IT-95-14-T, para. 71, (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2000)).
111. Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, paras. 249, 251 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia 1999)).
112. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 410 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntj01
0222e.pdf.
113. Id.
114. Id. para. 415.
115. Id. para. 416.
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relational nexus must exist between the acts of the defendant and the
attack itself, which is determined by a two part test:
(1) the commission of an act which, by its nature or consequences, is
objectively part of the attack; coupled with
(2) knowledge on the part of the accused that there is an attack on the
civilian population and that his act is part of the attack."6
The Commentary to the Two Additional Protocols of 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 suggests that the term "civilian population"
applies only to a narrowly defined range of people, and not to those who
may constitute members of the armed forces or to other active participants
in the conflict composed primarily of members from the civilian
population.'
The attack on the civilian population must also be "widespread or
systematic" to fall under the rubric of Article 5, which excludes random
acts of isolated violence."' To come under Article 5, however, only the
attack itself must be "widespread or systematic," and not necessarily the
actions of the perpetrators." 9 Indeed, the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadic
stated: "The very nature of the criminal acts in respect of which
competence is conferred upon the International Tribunal by Article 5, that
116. Id. para. 418 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, paras. 248, 251, 271 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1999); Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, para. 659
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1997); Prosecutor v. Mrksic, No. IT-95-13-R61,
para. 30 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1996) (Review of the Indictment
Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No.
IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, para. 6(b) (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2000)
(Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Exclusion of Evidence and Limitation of
Testimony)).
117. Id. para. 426 (citing COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 611, 1451-52 (Sandoz et al. eds., 1987)).
The fact that active partisans may be present among civilians, however, does not alter the
nature of the population under this definition. Id. para. 425 (citing Prosecutor v. Kupreskic,
No. IT-95-16-T, para. 549 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2000)).
118. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 427 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001) (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, para. 648 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1997)), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/
judgement/kuntj010222e.pdf.
119. Id. para. 431. In other words, a single isolated attack on an individual or individuals
generally cannot constitute a violation of Article 5. Id. para. 422; see also James C. O'Brien,
The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former
Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 648 (1993) (noting that attacks cannot be "simply
episodic and/or scattered attacks on individuals.").
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they be 'directed against any civilian population,' ensures that what is to be
alleged will not be one particular act but, instead, a course of conduct."'2 °
In Prosecutor v. Mrksic, the ICTY stated:
Crimes against humanity.., must be widespread or demonstrate a
systematic character. However, as long as there is a link with the
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, a single
act could qualify as a crime against humanity. As such, an individual
committing a crime against a single victim or a limited number of
victims might be recognized as guilty of a crime against humanity if his
acts were part of the specific context [of an attack against a civilian
population]."'
As an example, the court noted the turning in of Jews to Nazi
authorities during World War II: by itself, the act of an individual was not
enough to constitute an attack, but because of the systematic persecution
of Jews by the Nazis, the act became part of a "widespread and systematic"
122
attack upon the civilian population.
The mental element required for a violation of Article 5 is that the
accused must simply know that his actions occurred within the context of a
- • 123
broader "attack" on the civilian population. In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY concluded that the motives of a defendant
in the attack are irrelevant to a finding of mens rea.'24 Rather, theperpetrator must merely possess the intent to commit the offense in
120. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 422 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001) (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, para. 11 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Form of the Indictment)), at
http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntjOlO222e.pdf. In contrast, a single act
may constitute a "widespread or systematic" attack if it is executed within the context of a
larger assault on the civilian population. Id. The underlying offense also does not need to
constitute an attack in itself, but only must form a part of an overall course of conduct. Id.
para. 417. See also Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, paras. 248, 255 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia 1999).
121. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 417 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001) (quoting Prosecutor v. Mrksic, No. IT-95-13-R61, para. 30
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1996) (Review of the Indictment Pursuant to
Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence)), at http://www.un.org/icty/focal
trialc2/judgement/kuntjOlO222e.pdf.
122 Id.
123. Id. para. 434 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, para. 248 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 1999); Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, para. 659 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1997); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, No. IT-95-16-T, para. 556
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2000)).
124. Id. para. 433 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, para. 248 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 1999)).
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addition to the knowledge that his action is part of an overall attack on the
civilian population. l 5 Furthermore, he must have reason to believe that
126
the victim of the attack was a civilian. It is sufficient for the prosecution
to demonstrate that the actions of the accused took place amid a set of
accumulated acts of violence, even though individual acts within that set
127
may vary in their nature and gravity. Although the attack must be part
of the overall armed conflict, it may outlast the hostilities.'2 Nonetheless,
the civilian population must still be the primary object of attack in order to• -- - 129
constitute a crime against humanity. Furthermore, the scope of Article 5
contemplates both intrastate crimes as well as atrocities committed against
the populations of other parties to the conflict; in other words, the victims
do not need to be linked to any particular side in the conflict.' 30 In
Kunarac, the ICTY concluded that the actions of the defendants
constituted a "widespread and systematic" attack upon the civilian
population during the conflict in the Balkans."' In short, the ICTY
concluded that the rapes of Bosnian Muslim women were widespread and
systematic and that Kunarac and the others possessed the requisite intent
for attacking civilians. The women of Foca were rounded up at gunpoint
and then used as sex slaves."' Therefore, the actions of the defendants
125. Id. para. 434 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, para. 248 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 1999); Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, para. 659 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1997); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, No. IT-95-16-T, para. 556
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2000)).
126. Id. para. 435. In cases of doubt, the Tribunal assumes that the victim was a civilian.
Id.
127. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 419 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/Judgement/kuntj01
0222e.pdf.
128. Id. para. 420; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, para. 251 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 1999); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, No. IT-95-16-T, para. 546 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2000); Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1 -A, para. 69
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction).
129. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 421 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntj01
0222e.pdf.
130. Id. para. 423 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, para. 635 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 1997)).
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id.; see also A Closed Dark Place, supra note 1 (detailing the specific treatment of
the women of Foca).
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clearly constituted crimes against humanity in violation of Article 5 of the
ICTY Statute. 34
2. Conviction Under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
Under Article 3 of the Geneva Convention
Additionally, the defendants were found by the ICTY to have
committed war crimes, namely the crimes of rape and torture in violation
of both Article 3 of the Tribunal's statute and, under customary
international law, Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.135 Article 3 of the
ICTY Statute, which is titled Violations of the Laws or Customs of War
and incorporates the 1907 Hague Convention and the Regulations
annexed to it, states:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but
not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property."
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY interpreted the scope of Article 3
in Prosecutor v. Tadic:
It can be held that Article 3 is a general clause covering all violations of
humanitarian law not falling under Article 2 or covered by Articles 4 or
5 [of the Statute of the Tribunal], more specifically: (i) violations of the
Hague law on international conflicts; (ii) infringements of provisions of
the Geneva Conventions other than those classified as grave breaches
134. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/focaftrialc2/judgementkuntjOlO222e.
pdf.
135. See Press Release, supra note 99.
136. See Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 41, art. 3.
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by those Conventions; (iii) violations of common Article 3 [of the
Geneva Conventions] and other customary rules on internal conflicts;
(iv) violations of agreements binding upon the parties to the conflict,
considering qua treaty law, i.e., agreements which have not turned into
customary international law....37
Consequently, Article 3 is a "residual clause designed to ensure that
no serious violation of international humanitarian law is taken away from
the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal.', 138 Article 3 also applies to
both internal and international armed conflicts. 139 Two preliminary
requirements must be met in order for Article 3 to apply: (1) an armed
conflict, defined as "a resort to armed force between States or protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State,"'4 must be present and (2) a
"close nexus" must exist between the alleged crime and the armed
conflict.14' The second requirement is satisfied when "the alleged crimes
137. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 401 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001) (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 89
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), confirmed in, Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-A,
paras. 125, 136 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2001)), at http://www.
un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntj010222e.pdf.
138. Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 91 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction)).
139. Id. para. 402 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 137 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction), confirmed in, Prosecutor v. Delalic,, No. IT-96-21-A, paras. 140,
150 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2001)); see also Prosecutor v. Delalic, No.
IT-96-21-T, para. 184 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1998); Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1-T, para. 132 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1998);
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, No. IT-95-14-T, para. 161 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 2000).
140. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 402 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001) (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 70
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction)), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntjOlO222e.
pdf.
141. Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction); Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief I paras. 98-101, Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-
AR72 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1995); Prosecutor's Final Trial Brief
paras. 690-696, Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Yugoslavia
1995)); see also Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-T, para. 193 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 1998); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, No. IT-95-14-T, paras. 65, 69 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2000).
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were 'closely related to the hostilities.", 142  After these threshold
requirements are met, four general requirements are necessary for the
application of Article 3:
(i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of
international humanitarian law;
(ii) the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty
law, the required conditions must be met...
(iii) the violation must be "serious," that is to say, it must constitute
a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach
must involve grave consequences for the victim...
(iv) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or
conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the
person breaching the rule.1
4 3
Based upon these four elements, the ICTY concluded that the
general requirements for the application of Article 3 differ depending
upon the specific basis of the charges, namely whether the charges are
brought under a treaty or customary international law.'" If a charge is
brought based on a treaty violation, then two additional requirements must
be met. 45  These two requirements are: (1) the treaty must be
"unquestionably" binding upon the parties at the time the violation
occurred and (2) the treaty must not be in conflict with peremptory norms
142. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 402 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001) (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 70
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction)), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement
/kuntjOlO222e.pdf. The Trial Chamber in the Delalic case required "an obvious link" or a
"clear nexus" between the alleged crimes and the armed conflict. Prosecutor v. Delalic, No.
IT-96-21-T, para. 193, 197 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1998). The Trial
Chamber in the Blaskic case referred to this requirement as finding an "evident nexus
between the alleged crimes and the armed conflict as a whole." Prosecutor v. Blaskic, No.
IT-95-14-T, para. 69 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2000).
143. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 403 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001) (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 94
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), endorsed in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, No. IT-95-
14/1-A, para. 20 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2000)), at http://www.
un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/j udgement/kuntjOlO222e.pdf.




of international law.14 6 In situations where the second requirement is not
met, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY has suggested that charges may still
be brought, but based solely on customary international law.'
Additionally, the rapes perpetrated by Kunarac and the others constituted
a violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.'4 8 Article 3 states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall
remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect
to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) Taking of hostages;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial
humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to
the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of
special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present
146. Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 143 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction)).
147. Id.
148. Id. para. 408.
2002]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.
14 9
The ICTY noted that "it is well established in the jurisprudence of
the Tribunal that common Article 3, as set out in the Geneva Conventions,
has acquired the status of customary international law."15 Therefore, the
ICTY did not review any existing treaties because it found Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, as customary international law, to be a sufficient
basis alone for conviction.' Six requirements must be met in order for
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to apply. ' These requirements are:
(i) The violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of
international humanitarian law.
(ii) The rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty
law, the required conditions must be met.
(iii) The violation must be "serious," that is to say, it must constitute
a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach
must involve grave consequences for the victim.
(iv) The violation of the rule must entail, under customary or
conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the
person breaching the rule.
(v) There must be a close nexus between the violations and the
armed conflict.
(vi) The violations must be committed against persons taking no
active part in the hostilities.
153
149. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 405 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.orgiicty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kun
tj010222e.pdf; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287, available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/y4gcpcp.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2002) [hereinafter
Convention on Protection of Civilians].
150. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-2311-T, para. 406 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001) (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, paras. 98,
134 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction); Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-A, para. 143
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2001)), at http://www.un.org/icty/focaJ
trialc2/judgement/kuntjOlO222e.pdf.
151. Id.
152. Id. para. 407 (citing Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-A, para. 420 (Int'l Crim.




Additionally, the ICTY noted that Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions may require a relationship between the perpetrator and a
party to the conflict.54 In the instant case, however, the three defendants
were members of Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces; consequently, the
ICTY declined to determine whether a relationship was necessary."' The
ICTY concluded that the actions of Kunarac and the two other defendants
met all of the four general requirements set out in Article 3 of the ICTY
Statute First, the rapes constituted a violation of international law by
being carried out contrary to the prohibitions set forth in Article 3, and
thus entail criminal responsibility on the part of the defendants."' Second,
the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY explicitly held that Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions is part of customary international law. Third, the
Trial Chamber of the ICTY noted that, in light of the Appeals Chamber's
Jurisdiction Decision in the Tadic case, it is still an open question whether
all breaches of Article 3 constitute "serious" violations of customary
international law."' The Trial Chamber concluded, however, that rape is a
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 407 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgcment/kun
tj010222e.pdf.
157. Id. para. 408.
158. Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 98 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction), confirmed in Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-A, paras. 143, 150 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2001)); see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, No. IT-95-14-
T, para. 166 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2000); Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, para. 35, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993). "Yugoslavia ratified both Geneva Protocols (Geneva Protocol I Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts ... and Geneva Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts... on 11 June 1979) and Bosnia and Herzegovina succeeded
to both Additional Protocols on 31 December 1992. Yugoslavia ratified the four Geneva
Conventions (including Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of 1949 of 12 Aug 1949, which is most relevant to the present case)
on 21 April 1950 and Bosnia and Herzegovina succeeded to the Geneva Conventions on 31
December 1992." Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, n.1073 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judge
ment/kuntjO10222e.pdf.
159. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 408 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001) (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 134
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, No. IT-95-14-T, para. 134
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serious offense; therefore, it unquestionably satisfies the third general
requirement of Article 3.'60 Finally, the fourth general requirement was
satisfied because the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held in Prosecutor v.
Tadic that "customary international law imposes criminal liability for
serious violations of Article 3 .,,61 Therefore, the application of the
aforementioned Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions satisfies the fourth
element of ICTY Statute Article 3162 Consequently, the defendants were
criminally liable for the rapes under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute and
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.63
In short, the Kunarac decision unequivocally establishes rape and
sexual enslavement as crimes against humanity, and it leaves no doubt that
"rape, torture, and outrages upon personal dignity ... entail criminal
responsibility under customary international law."' 6 Furthermore, it
reiterated the conclusion that rape and sexual enslavement could also be
considered war crimes. 16' Although this decision may not necessarily
prevent a policy of mass rape against civilians in future wars, it nonetheless
establishes a clear boundary for intolerable behavior. In other words,
simply because this behavior may not be prevented does not also mean
that it will go unpunished.
IV. CRITICISMS OF KUNARAC
Like previous international law decisions that affected the scope of
the nature of crimes against humanity, many recent decisions of the ICTY,
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia)), at http://www.un.org/ictyffoca/trialc2/judge
ment/kuntj010222e.pdf.
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 134 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction), confirmed in Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-A, para. 174 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2001)); see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, No. IT-95-14-T,
para. 134 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2000).
162. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 408 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntj01
0222e.pdf.
163. See id.
164. Id.; see also Landmark Ruling, AMNESTY MAG., Mar./Apr. 2001, available at
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news/mag/mar01/news.shtml.
165. See, e.g., Christopher Scott Maravilla, Rape As A War Crime: The Implications of the
International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia's Decision in Prosecutor v.




such as Kunarac, are not without criticism.) All such decisions represent
a trade-off between domestic state autonomy and the desire of the
international community to pursue justice following the commission of
particularly inhumane crimes."' Kunarac clearly focuses more on the
justice side of the trade-off, but it may go too far in violating the
sovereignty of either the states or the individuals who were prosecuted.)6
Moreover, it may produce by-products, such as the violation of due process
and the reinforcement of gender stereotypes that undercut its overall
attempt to do justice.9  Ultimately, this article argues that the Kunarac
decision is legally, morally and humanely justified, but the criticisms of
Kunarac are nonetheless worth exploring, particularly for what they reveal
about the nature of international human rights justice and how they may
be answered in future human rights' cases.
A. Kunarac Violates the State Sovereignty of Serbia
Under the Charter of the United Nations, one state cannot interfere
with the domestic affairs of another state.'70 The idea of state sovereignty
is a bedrock principle in international law, and prosecuting state officials
acting under government orders may be seen as a violation of that state
sovereignty. 7' To that end, Serbian officials argued that their actions were
domestic affairs within Yugoslavia, and thus are not subject to outside
interference, especially from a court considered by them to possess an anti-
Serb bias.
This criticism fails to be persuasive for three reasons. First, Foca is
located in a state, Bosnia-Herzegovina, which achieved the criteria of
166. See, e.g., George Will, Lawless Redress, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2001, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentld=A51
412-2001Aug8 (raising "serious questions about ad hoc uses of judicial forums created in
response to particular events, forms such as the court for the former Yugoslavia and the
tribunal concerning genocide in Rwanda.").
167. McCormack, supra note 25, at 730-32.
168. See infra Parts IV.A.-B.
169. See infra Parts IV.C.-D.
170. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7.
171. See generally Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International
Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 417 (1999). See also Guy Roberts, Assault on Sovereignty: The Clear and Present
Danger of the New International Criminal Court, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 35 (2001).
172. See International Action Center, Milosevic Puts "Tribunal" on Trial, at http://www.
iacenter.org/sm-tohague.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Milosevic Puts
"Tribunal" on Trial].
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statehood and was recognized as such in 1992. 73 Therefore, it is difficult to
argue that the mass rape of Bosnian women by Serbian military officials
114
was inherently a domestic Serbian incident. Second, states generally can
only be held to the standards to which they consent to be bound; however,
no modern state asserts the rights not to be bound by jus cogens norms or
customary international law that prohibits the commission of genocide or
crimes against humanity.17 In other words, Serbia cannot claim that its
actions are not subject to prosecution by an international tribunal because
it undertook policies that violated international law, even if similar
violations in the past had not been prosecuted.
Third, and perhaps more consequentially, previous judgments by
international tribunals regarding war crimes and crimes against humanity• . 176
suggest that this argument is invalid. Although international law does
not recognize precedent as determinative to the same degree that the US
legal system does, the decisions of previous international tribunals are not
without some type of precedential value.177 Indeed, Nazi officials offered
similar argument during the Nuremberg Trials, and they were roundly
• 178
rejected. In other words, a state does not have the sovereignty to
massacre its people under any kind of international standard.
B. The Decision Violates the Personal and Individual Sovereignty of
Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic
Arguably, the prosecution of Kunarac - and all other persons from
the former Yugoslavia as well - is an interference with personal,
individual sovereignty. 7 9 These individuals were taken from their home
173. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2001, at http:/www.
odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2002).
174. Human Rights Watch, The Milosevic Case: Questions and Answers, available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/08/milo-q&a-0829.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
175. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 783-84 (2001). But see Prosper
Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 427 (1983)
(asserting that jus cogens norms should not be viewed as customary international law
because they do not require consent).
176. See Christin B. Coan, Rethinking the Spoils of War: Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime
in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 183,203 (2000).
177. Roberts, supra note 175, at 775.
178. Coan, supra note 176, at 203.
179. Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Position of the Individual in International Law, 31
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 241 (2001); see also Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The
Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist
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state, detained in a state on the other side of the continent and placed
before an international tribunal whom they regard as biased amid a highly
charged political backdrop of the worst human rights' abuses in Europe
since World War II.'80 Consequently, they feel that as individuals they
cannot get a fair hearing in an international forum and should perhaps be
tried domestically, if they are to be tried at all. 8' Moreover, they feel that
they should not even be tried as individuals before an international
tribunal.182 Indeed, if any entity should be tried, it is the state because
these individuals were simply following orders from the state.'83
These arguments also fail upon closer inspection. First, international
public policy outweighs any interference with personal sovereignty
because of the likelihood that these individuals would never be tried in
Serbia." As Judge Wald observed, the ICTY can perform important
"accountability functions that national courts in the thrall of leaders who
are themselves alleged war criminals cannot."'85 Second, Article 7 of the
ICTY statute explicitly considers individual criminal responsibility for acts
committed in relation to the conflict in Yugoslavia; therefore, the ICTY
itself has personal jurisdiction to prosecute anyone who may be criminally
liable for violations of international law in this setting.' Furthermore,
Article 7(4) expressly prohibits a "just following orders" defense, although
it does allow such a claim as a mitigating factor. 87 Moreover, the ICTY's
ability to prosecute individuals reflects a growing trend in international law
View, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 302, 309 (1999) (noting that "[c]rimes against humanity constitute a
more difficult case as regards individual responsibility").
180. See Human Rights Watch, Bosnia and Hercegovina, available at http://www.hrw.org
/wr2kl/europebosnia.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
181. Letter from the Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doe. A148/170-S/25801 (1993); see also Simma & Paulus, supra note 179, at 314 (noting that
"[sltates remain ... reluctant ... to bring their own leaders to justice.").
182. Milosevic Puts "Tribunal" on Trial, supra note 172.
183. But see CNN, supra note 93 (quoting Judge Mumba's admonition that "[f]awless
opportunists should expect no mercy, no matter how low their position in the chain of
command may be.").
184. Wald, supra note 44, at 117-118; see also Simma & Paulus, supra note 181, at 314
(arguing that failing to prosecute domestically heads of state "runs counter to the stated
purpose of international humanitarian law, i.e., to exclude certain criminal acts from the
legitimate exercise of state functions.").
185. Id.
186. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 41, art. 7.
187. Id. art. 7(4).
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to expand the legal personalty of individuals.lu Finally, the defense of
"just following orders," even if it not prohibited by Article 7(4) of the
ICTY enabling statute, has been rejected soundly by international law
since Nuremberg.
181
The two sovereignty criticisms have a good deal of intuitive appeal
upon first glance, yet neither has been recognized as persuasive for
purposes of preventing the trial of suspected war criminals 9" Indeed, the
failure of these arguments suggests that the international community
believes in a hierarchy of values and state and personal sovereignty may be
trumped in extreme circumstances. 19' In other words, the Kunarac
prosecutions and decision do constitute violations of state and individual
sovereignty, but they do so in the name of a higher ideal: justice.
C. Kunarac Represents Ex Post Facto, Retroactive Adjudication
Third, Kunarac may be criticized on the grounds that it convicted the
three defendants of an ex post facto crime which thereby violated a sense
192
of due process and fairness. Prior to Kunarac, rape was a reprehensible,
vicious and inhumane action. However, it was also not explicitly
recognized within international law as a crime against humanity)9' The
Charter authorizing the Nuremberg trials, for example, did not explicitly
list rape as a criminal offense.' 94 Rape was a violation of the Geneva
Conventions and was generally recognized as a crime under international
law. However, rape "overwhelmingly has been viewed by the
international community as an inevitable product of war, and as such, has
seldom been prosecuted."'195 Indeed, as Human Rights Watch has noted:
188. See, e.g., P.K. Menon, The International Personality of Individuals in International
Law: A Broadening of the Traditional Doctrine, 1 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 151, 182
(1992).
189. Coan, supra note 178, at 203.
190. See supra notes 171-189 and accompanying text.
191. Id.
192. See McCormack, supra note 25, at 731.
193. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-2311-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntj01222e.
pdf.
194. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annexed to the London
Agreement, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 1547, 8 U.N.T.S. 284, 288. Rape was not
specifically criminalized under Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, nor were torture or
imprisonment, when committed against any civilian population- See United Nations, ICTY
Bulletin: History from Nuremberg to the Hague, at http://www.un.org/icty/BL/05art5e.htm
(last visited Sept. 26, 2002).
195. Coan, supra note 178, at 184.
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Despite [some] legal precedents, rape has long been mischaracterized
and dismissed by military and political leaders as a private crime, the
ignoble act of the occasional soldier. Worse still, it has been accepted
precisely because it is so commonplace. Longstanding discriminatory
attitudes have viewed crimes against women as incidental or less serious
violations.'9
Furthermore, rape had not been defined under international law,
leaving the ICTY to try "sexual assault cases under a statute that offers
groundbreaking international recognition of the crime of rape [even
though] the ICTY's mandate explicitly prohibits it from applying anything
other than accepted definitions of international humanitarian law.,
197
Therefore, the ICTY's assessment "of the legal gray area occupied by rape
under international humanitarian law cannot help but position it in what
some would call a legislative role."'98 Therefore, the ICTY, despite its
Article 5(g) statutory charge, had no clear legal justification for trying rape
as a crime against humanity.
Consequently, because rape was not defined expressly as a crime
against humanity at the time that the events in Foca transpired, then the
standard by which Kunarac and the other defendants were prosecuted was
necessarily an ex post facto one. This criticism was one also raised by
Senator Robert Taft during the Nuremberg trials because such ad hoc
international tribunals like the IMT at Nuremberg seemed to run against
the traditional American notion of justice which prohibits someone from
being retroactively convicted of a crime. 99 Indeed, this idea is even
enshrined in the United States Constitution, which raises the obvious
question of why Kunarac and the other criminal defendants should be held
to a standard beyond that of the United States Constitution.)°
Although this criticism may have some initial appeal, two counter-
arguments suggest that it is not as valid as it may first appear. First,
previous conventions and customs of international law explicitly
prohibited torture and enslavement, both of which may cover the crime of
rape, especially as it was perpetrated in Foca and the surrounding areas.201
196. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Applauds Rwanda Rape Verdict, at
http://www.hrw.orglpress98/sept/rrape9O2.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2002).
197. Id.
19& Id.
199. See JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 211-24 (1956).
200. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
201. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available at http://www.unhchr.
chlhtml/menu3/b/h cat 39.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
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Consequently, rape may have been implicitly a war crime/crime against
humanity under these definitions, and therefore, the defendants in
Kunarac were committing a crime recognized as such at the time.
Furthermore, even though there was no explicit definition of rape within
international law and even though rape was rarely prosecuted as a war
crime, it was nonetheless recognized as a crime under the Geneva
Conventions.202 Therefore, the acts of Kunarac and the others clearly
constituted a crime even if that crime was not well defined at the time it
occurred.
Second, it may be argued that any standard permitting rape during
war had already been abandoned by the same reasoning that also
prohibited torture and enslavement.'O° From this perspective, such an
argument is not dissimilar from that offered by the United States Supreme
Court in Rogers v. Tennessee,2 4 in which the Court upheld the conviction
of a man for murder even though his actions did not constitute that crime
under the law at the time when they occurred. In the words of Justice
O'Connor, the Court was merely bringing "the law into conformity with
reason and common sense., 205 A similar logic could be applied to the
situation surrounding Kunarac where the ICTY brought international law
regarding war crimes and crimes against humanity into conformity with
reason and common sense, especially in light of other similar crimes
already prohibited.
D. Kunarac Reifies Women as a Weaker Sex in Need of Special
Protections
Finally, this decision may reify old stereotypes of women as a weaker
sex in need of special protection under international law. Indeed, the
Geneva Conventions on which the ICTY relied for part of its decision only
mentions women in connection with rape. 6 Moreover, the ICTY's "case
law stipulates that witnesses who have suffered traumatic experiences are
not necessarily considered unreliable, and its statute requires no
corroboration of testimony from rape victims." 20 Consequently, it
reiterates women's role as a helpless victim by implicitly taking her word
202. Convention on Protection of Civilians, supra note 149, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S 287.
203. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
204. 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
205. Id.
206. Convention on Protection of Civilians, supra note 149.
207. CBS News, Rape Now a War Crime, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories
/2001/02/22/world/main273808.shtml (last visited Sept. 26, 2002).
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without corroboration,2 0 8 although so far no conviction has occurred
without corroborating evidence.
This argument fails to consider the true nature of the Kunarac
decision in two respects. First, this decision applies equally to men and
women meaning that both genders may require its protections.2 0, Second,
men are already accorded protections during time of war, both as soldiers
210
and civilians. Indeed, the "exclusion of the corroboration requirement
'confirms the formal international standards of equality between the
sexes."'' 211 This decision simply brings women into an equal position as
212
men, vis-A-vis their status as innocent civilians. In short, far from
reinforcing old stereotypes about women and their weakness and
vulnerability during war, this decision actually makes them more fully
members of the international community and subject to the same
211protections as men.
V. JUSTIFICATIONS OF KUNARAC AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The criticisms cited above suggest that the Kunarac decision has both
214
moral and political implications in addition to its legal importance.
Indeed, the arguments used to refute the criticism of Kunarac may be
flipped to provide a strong justification both for the decision itself and also
for the jurisprudential method by which it was obtained. Kunarac is
justified legally, as a logical extension of international law regarding war
crimes and crimes against humanity. It is justified morally because it
explicitly criminalizes a thoroughly immoral act. It is also justified from a
208. See Rule 96 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. SCOR, 23d Plenary Sess.
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. IT/32[REV:18 (1994),
available at http:/Iwww.un.org/ictyfbasic/rpe/IT32_revl8con.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2002).
209. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.orglicty/foca/trialc2/Judgement/kuntjOlO222e.
pdf.
210. Id.; see also Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, Justice by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 288 (2001) (noting how the ICTY has
addressed perceived international legal gender disparities).
211. Ivkovic, supra note 210, at 287 (quoting Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Radical Rules: The
Effects of Evidential and Procedural Rules on the Regulation of Sexual Violence in War, 60
ALB. L. REV. 883, 901 (1997)).
212. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http:/lwww.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntjOlO222e.
pdf.
213. But see Waller, supra note 30.
214. See infra Parts V.A.2.-3.
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humanistic perspective because it further establishes standards of human
behavior that should govern even when there is disagreement within the
larger international community. Indeed, at its core, the Kunarac decision
is about protecting humanity from further atrocities, and therein may lay
its true importance over time.
A. Justifications
The justification for Kunarac rests on three principal foundations: law,
morality, and respect for humanity. All three of these principals are
interrelated, yet they each identify an element of the decision that is
necessary to understand its full force.
1. Legal
Prior to Kunarac, torture and enslavement - both of which may
encompass rape - were already considered both war crimes and crimes
against humanity; indeed, prohibitions on these acts had generally
acquired the status of jus cogens norms.2 15 Thus, the fact that "rape often
functions in ways similar to other human rights abuses makes all the more
striking the fact that, until recently, it has not been condemned like any
other abuse. '216 Moreover, rape was considered a criminal act under
international law even if it was rarely prosecuted."' Additionally, the
prosecution of rape as both a war crime and as a crime against humanity
was expressly contemplated by the ICTY's enabling statute.
Consequently, the decision in Kunarac represents the culmination of a
series of legal trends - dating back to at least the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War - all
pointing toward the conclusion that official, systematic rape during war is
unequivocally a war crime and a crime against humaty.9 Indeed, Human
Rights Watch had already asserted even before Kunarac that "[r]ape is
explicitly prohibited under international humanitarian law governing both
215. Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 554, 568-71 (1995).
216. Human Rights Watch, International Protections, available at http://www.hrw.org
/aboutlprojects/womrep/General-24.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
217. See, e.g., Patricia Viseur Sellers & Kaoru Okuizumi, Intentional Prosecution of
Sexual Assaults, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMp. PROBS. 45, 46-47 (1997); see also Theodor
Meron, Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 424, 425
(1993) (noting that individual soldiers have also been convicted in domestic courts for
rape).
218. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 41.
219. McCormack, supra note 25, passim.
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international and internal conflicts."' 20 Thus, after Kunarac, there can be
no more confusion or uncertainty regarding whether rape is to be tolerated
as an act of war. The decision is clear and compelling, and its legal
justification is without doubt.
2. Moral
No society anywhere condones the physical, nonconsensual sexual
221violation of another human being. Unlike other crimes which may be
morally defensible (e.g. murder in self-defense; murder as euthanasia; theft
222
of truly necessary goods), rape is never justifiable. Criminalizing rape in
the international community recognizes this point and seeks to raise the
moral dignity of all members of that community.223  Moreover, it
acknowledges that "[r]ape is a moral issue between men and women, not
just between one 'moral monster' and his victim. 224  Furthermore,
Kunarac reminds us that "[r]ape cannot be properly understood in moral
terms without seeing it as a matter of collective responsibility, not just an
issue of personal responsibility., 22  Thus, Kunarac does not neglect a
moral dimension to its legal considerations, in part because its legal




The decision provides guidance for standards for living as humans in
221
an increasingly diverse world. It reinforces prohibitions on physical
violation, racism/ethnic hatred, and sexism, all of which guide
interpersonal interaction within the larger community of humans. 8
Moreover, Kunarac reminds us of the human obligations of tolerance of
220. Human Rights Watch, supra note 216.
221. See Meron, supra note 215, at 568.
222. See Rape: It's Not Your Fault, Some Misconceptions and Facts About Rape, SURVIVE
REPORT, available at http://survive.org.ukfindexl.html#miscon (last visited Sept. 05, 2002).
223. See generally Meron, supra note 215 (noting the "great humanitarian importance" of
criminalizing such behavior).
224. Larry May, Rape and Collective Responsibility (Aug. 1997), available at http:I/news-
info.wustl.edu/opeds/opeds97/MayAug97.html.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Jane Lampman, Morality and War, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 11,
2001, available at http://www.csmonitor.comi2001/1011/p14s1-lire.html.
227. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kuntj010222e.
pdf.
228. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L
L. 239 (2000).
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those that are different and of the need to recognize similarity as part of
the human community.23 Acknowledging this sense of humanity is the
first step toward effectuating a change in international behavior that may
one day culminate in the practical abolition of diseased acts like the ones
which occurred at Foca.23 Indeed, it is "[o]nly then can we begin to see a
change in the way the international community, comprised of states
themselves, responds to acts of aggression that violate not only human
rights laws, but our own sense of morality and decency."' 231
B. Significance
Much was written about the trajectory of the ICTY leading up to the
232Kunarac decision. However, the academic community has been much
quieter than the popular press since the decision was issued in February
2001.233 Part of this academic reticence may stem from caution in order to
avoid prematurely trying to assert Kunarac's significance. Indeed, its true
significance may not be known for many years, even though the media has
already hailed it as a landmark decision.23 With more than a year passed
for perspective, the influence of Kunarac seems most likely to be strongest
across four separate areas that touch international law.
1. Use by Other Tribunals
The most immediate impact of Kunarac may be its reference by other
international tribunals faced with adjudicating claims of rape as either a
war crime or a crime against humanity.35 The enabling statute of the
229. Id.
230. Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 316 (1999).
231. Walter, supra note 30, at 658.
232. See, e.g., Darren Anne Nebesar, Gender-Based Violence as a Weapon of War, 4 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147 (1998); Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: Gender-Based
Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the Failure of International Human Rights Law to
Comprehend the Injuries, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 793 (1997); Sharon A. Healey, Prosecuting
Rape Under the Statute of the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 21 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 327, 350 (1995); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1993).
233. As of March 2002, only one major piece has been published, focusing primarily on
Kunarac and its treatment of war crimes. See generally Maravilla, supra note 165 (discussing
the implications of Kunarac for war crimes jurisprudence).
234. See, e.g., Barnaby Mason, Rape: A Crime Against Humanity, BBC NEWS, Feb. 22,
2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hilenglish/worldeurope/newsid_1184000/1184763.
stm (hailing the decision as a "crucial precedent").
235. See supra notes 231-233 and accompanying text.
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ICTY, and the Treaty of Rome creating the International Criminal Court,
both explicitly consider the international criminal prosecution of rape.
236
However, Kunarac provides some additional, possible interpretations of
those provisions by providing a definition of rape for use in international
law.237 Moreover rape - and ethnic cleansing in general - has tragically
become a widespread policy for warfare in much of the developing
world.2  Consequently, future prosecutions of mass rapes in these areas
will rely on the standard established in Kunarac.
Admittedly, Kunarac does little about a persistent problem in
international law: enforcement. 39 Indeed, perhaps one reason why
Kunarac was so long in coming was that rape during war was rarely
prosecuted and judgments could not be enforced.24° This experience stands
in stark contrast to the prosecution of other similarly heinous crimes.24
Indeed, this "differential treatment of rape makes clear that the
problem-for the most part-lies not in the absence of adequate legal
prohibitions but in the international community's willingness to tolerate
sexual abuse against women."242  Therefore, although Kunarac may
provide a standard for other prosecutions, it may not necessarily act as a
forceful deterrent to future mass rapes; nonetheless, its significance for
providing a useful international legal standard regarding a heinous crime
cannot be overstated.
236. Kristen Boon, Rape and Forced Pregnancy Under the ICC Statute: Human Dignity,
Autonomy and Consent, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 625 (2001). But see Jelena Pejic,
Panel II: Adjudicating Violence: Problems Confronting International Law and Policy on
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: The Tribunal and the ICC: Do Precedents
Matter? 60 ALB. L. REV. 841 (1997) (arguing that the ICTY provides little if any
precedential value for the ICC).
237. See generally Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, paras. 596-598
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/
judgement/kuntj010222e.pdf.
238. See, e.g., Sierra Leone: Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape, 11 HuM. RTS.
WATCH REP., 3(A) (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/SIERLE99-
03.htm#P787134882.
239. See Lucas W. Andrews, Comment, Sailing Around the Flat Earth: The International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as a Failure of Jurisprudential Theory, 11 EMORY INT'L
L. REV. 471, 510-13 (1997).
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2. Definition of Rape Under International Law
The Trial Chamber also adopted a definition of rape, first
contemplated in Prosecutor v. Furundzija before the ICTY and in
Prosecutor v. Akayesu before the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), into customary international law.14 ' This usage of the
term was based upon definitions found in the common law of some of the
world's major legal systems including Sweden, Canada, Germany, and the
United Kingdom. 2' Rape is not an international crime per se, only if it
occurs in the context of war or a systematic campaign. 24  Consequently,
there is no established international definition, but the ICTY provided one
which may now be used in all subsequent cases. In its judgment, the ICTY
presented its definition of rape which emphasized a context of aggression
and coercion:
The Chamber must define rape, as there is no commonly accepted
definition of this term in international law. While rape has been defined
in certain national jurisdictions as non-consensual intercourse,
variations on the act of rape may include acts which involve the
insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices not considered to be
intrinsically sexual. The Chamber considers that rape is a form of
aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be
captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts.... The
Chamber defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed on a person under circumstances, which are coercive. Sexual
violence which includes rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual
nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are
coercive.24'
This definition allows for the "reformation of the standards of rape
prosecution [which] may also 'assist in the creation of generally accepted
international standards on the adjudication of sexual offenses. '' 247
243. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998); The American Society of International Law, International Law in Brief,
available at http://www.asil.org/ilib/ilibOll5.htm#01 (Dec. 21-25, 1998); Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, No. N ICTR-96-4-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1998), available
at http://www.ictr.org (last visited Sept. 27, 2002).
244. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 439 (Int'l Grim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/ udgement/kuntjOl
0222e.pdf.
245. See id.
246. See generally id. paras. 596-98.
247. Ivkovic, supra note 210, at 287.
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3. Further Equalizes the Two Genders Before International Law
As suggested previously, the Kunarac decision goes a long way toward
248
equalizing the status of men and women under individual law. It affords
women almost identical protections as men and takes almost all violations
of the individual to be unacceptable in times of war. It does not single out
women as a weaker class of victims in need of special protection, but
rather it brings women more fully into the larger class of human beings
249
who all require protection.
4. Perhaps Establishes an Inviolable Jus Cogens Principle Against
Rape
Jus cogens norms in international law are difficult to identify, and
because of their absolute, "strict liability" character, there is no general
consensus on which norms should qualify °50 Prohibitions against piracy,
slavery, and genocide are among the ones most commonly asserted as jus
cogens norms, and over time a prohibition on rape may also be included.
To be sure, the Kunarac decision does not explicitly place rape into this
category, but it presents an extremely strong argument regarding why a
prohibition on rape should be such a norm. Indeed, it leaves little room
for the argument why prohibiting rape should not be treated as a jus
cogens principle, and it forces one to make an inhumane, almost barbaric
argument regarding why rape should not be expressly prohibited in all
situations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The results of this note's analyses show that the expansion in Kunarac
of the definition of a "crime against humanity" is logical, moral, and
humane. Contrary to the arguments of some, classifying rape/enslavement
as a crime against humanity does not violate international laws/norms of
sovereignty, nor does it reinforce archaic stereotypes of women as a
weaker sex in need of rescue. Rather, it leads to an opposite conclusion,
24& See supra Part IV.D.
249. See, e.g., Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the
Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 97 (1999); Hilary
Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 379 (1999). But see
Waller, supra note 30.
250. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(defining a jus cogens norm as "a principle of international law that is 'accepted by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted' (quoting Comm. of U.S. Citizens in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.D.C.
1988))).
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namely that women now possess truly equal standing with men in the
human community in terms of legal protections from personal violation.
Moreover, the Kunarac decision closes -gaps in existing international law,
establishes a useful foundation for future prosecutions of crimes against
humanity, and creates an important bulwark for civilians against ethnic,
gender and other "difference-motivated" crimes committed by a state or a
state-sponsored group. In fact, this decision may even change how war is
conducted in the future, and it will almost certainly impact the
International Criminal Court's view of crimes against humanity once that
body formally comes into being." Therefore, the Kunarac decision is
warranted legally (because it bridges gaps in existing law), morally
(because it explicitly criminalizes the most immoral physical violation
imaginable), and humanely (because it establishes standards for the entire
human community by which to judge and prosecute crimes against the
community regardless of where they transpire).
251. See, e.g., Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/.
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